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Two enemy nations may be engaged in battles for 
years striving for victory. However, it only takes one 
decisive day to indicate the winner. 
Sun Tzu, “The Art of War” 
 
 
It appears, therefore, that the law of comparative advantage works in this case as 
well! It is recommended that Greece focus on providing the capital equipment by 
investing in research and development, purchasing latest technology systems and 
modernizing the existing stock of weapons. Cyprus, on the other hand, will be required 
to provide the manpower indispensable to man this equipment in the most efficient way. 
We feel, however, that one or two words of caution are necessary in this case: The 
first issue concerns the way in which Cyprus may contribute in terms of manpower. The 
conclusions drawn in the previous chapter concerning the alliance burden sharing 
between Greece and Cyprus are based on their population growth rates. The fact 
remains, however, that in terms of absolute figures Cyprus is too weak to face a large 
part of the personnel requirements of both allies, given that the number of male Cypriots 
which join the armed forces every year does not exceed a few thousand. This means, 
therefore, that Cyprus will only be in a position to contribute to the alliance manpower 
needs if it resorts to professionalism, over and above the compulsory military service 
which is a must for reasons similar to those applying for Greece and analyzed in Interim 
1, earlier on. The second word of caution refers to the Greek case. The recommendation 
that Greece focuses on the provision of the equipment that will support the function of 
the alliance does not, by any means, imply that the importance of the human element is 
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to be neglected. The recommendation which concerns combining a professional army 
with a compulsory military service addresses both allies and leaves absolutely no room 
for cheap politics which imply that the two systems are substitute solutions. In fact, 
professionalism and compulsory service must complement one another in a way that 
combines thorough knowledge of modern technology with high morale. Since we have 
already discussed the reasoning behind this argument extensively earlier on in this book, 
we do not feel that we should expand on the extent to which the undoubtedly high skills 
of professional forces can ever be a substitute to the enthusiasm of conscripts. We can 
only point out that our current geopolitical and strategic environment does not enjoy the 
delicate, however, effective balance of powers it did during the Cold War era. To make 
things worse, and unlike what some people love to support
1
, tension in the area that 
concerns the Greek-Cypriot alliance is far from easing given the recent Middle East 
crisis. This widespread volatility in the international setting, therefore, leads to 
underlining the importance of strong armed forces on both national and international 
levels. Thus, the initiative taken by Germany, France, Belgium and Luxemburg with 
regard to a European defence mechanism, which could function in a manner 
independent of the NATO structure has become the cause of serious reconsiderations 
that concern the extent to which national defence budgets should be curtailed. As 
regards Greece, the country has to face a considerable extra burden imposed on its 
economy by a number of defence programmes required to support its alliance 
commitments, which means that the government has no option but to increase the funds 
allocated to defence activities. This proves that not only is the relaxed attitude of the 
Greek government concerning external threat not justified, but, in addition, the 
statements made concerning reductions of the defence budget do not reflect the true 
picture.  
History teaches that demagogy of this extent can entail a significant national cost. 
Greece has paid the cost of demagogy very dearly, starting with the Peloponnesian War 
(431-404bc.), through to the National Revolution in 1821 and the Asia Minor Ethnic 
Disaster in 1922. On the contrary, Greece reaped the benefits of not succumbing to 
                                                          
1
 See for example, the IMF latest report (February 13, 2003), following the mission’s visit to Athens 
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demagogy in the early nineties, when the government devoted a large sum of money, 
despite the hysteria of the opposition leaders, to support the Hellenic Navy, a very wise 
move considering the results of the 1912–1913 Balkan Wars.  
The post-Copenhagen summit period is a crucial one for the geopolitical and 
strategic interests of Greece and Cyprus. It is a period during which the international 
environment currently under considerable revision will play a much more important role 
compared to the past and during which nothing can be taken for granted not even the 
Cyprus full EU membership, leaving, therefore, absolutely no room for demagogy!  
The following chapter aims at underlining the increased role of the international 
factors and the complexity of one of the problems faced, namely that of Cyprus.  
In such cases, however, in which political uncertainty prevails, decision-makers and 
policy proponents usually face serious difficulties when approaching significant, real-
world systems, the main one being the choice of the appropriate analytical tool that 
would reflect the complexity of such international geopolitical systems. Moreover, 
given the problems associated with the availability and reliability of data and the 
difficulties encountered when formulating a mathematical model, we feel that efforts to 
communicate and understand a particular system as well as to propose policies must rely 
on natural language arguments in the absence of formal models. This is why we have 
decided to treat the Cyprus issue by using the technique of Fuzzy Cognitive Maps which 
is particularly suitable for modeling political problems and supporting a decision-
making process. The following chapter explains how this method is combined with 
Genetic Algorithms thus creating a hybrid model reflecting the complication of the 
Cyprus issue. Since the “cut-off date” of the paper that follows has been the first day of 
the US – UK operations against Iraq, the reader will notice that the forecasting ability of 
the algorithm used has been very satisfactory on the basis of the scenarios employed. 
These consider, among other variables, the extent to which an environment of intensity 
might prevail on the island, the possibilities of a viable solution of the Cyprus issue, as 
well as the reactions of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots following the full EU accession 
of Cyprus. 
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The Cyprus Puzzle and the Greek – Turkish Arms Race: 
Forecasting Developments Using Genetically Evolved Fuzzy 
Cognitive Maps* 
By 
Andreas S. Andreou, Nicos H. Mateou and George A. Zombanakis 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
During the Copenhagen summit conference on December 12 to 14, 2002, the 15 EU 
member sates decided on the enlargement of the Union by granting accession in May 
2004 to ten new members, namely Poland, The Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus. The acceptance of the latter has 
been, formally at least, unconditional with reference to the solution of the Cyprus 
problem, with the summit declaration favoring further negotiations for a united Cyprus. 
In fact the declaration expresses satisfaction as the Greek and Turkish Cypriots are 
committed to continue their negotiations aiming at reaching an agreement until the end 
of February 2003. In case an agreement has not been reached by that date, then the 
“acquis communautaire” will be suspended for the north part of the island until the 
Cyprus issue has been resolved. 
It is only straightforward, therefore, that failure to reach an agreement will deprive 
the Turkish Cypriots from an initial €273 million which the European Council has 
decided to pump to the north as part of a special development program which will allow 
                                                          
*
  Accepted to be published in “Defence and Peace Economics” (forthcoming). 
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it to catch up with the rest of the island. Such a failure, moreover, will doom the north, 
half the population of which is first – or second – generation settlers from Turkey, to 
continue to depend heavily on aid from Ankara. Ironically, it is the Turkish Cypriot 
authorities that insist on a loose confederate system with the two communities 
remaining independent sovereign states and their populations physically separated. 
Massive demonstrations in the north during late December 2002, however, have made it 
clear that the Turkish Cypriot population does not share its authorities’ views on the 
subject.  
The UN Secretary General has attempted to resolve the issue by submitting the so–
called Annan Plan in November 2002, proposing a Swiss canton system. The 
government of Cyprus has agreed to accept the Annan Plan as a basis for a final 
settlement, despite the risk that the burden added on the Cypriot economy by the 
underdeveloped north may lead to its failure to meet the Maastricht criteria and, 
consequently, to join the EMU and the Eurozone
2
. While the Turkish Islamic 
government, however, has publicly maintained that a settlement based on the Annan 
Plan is possible by the deadline set, the Turkish military bluntly told the government at 
the National Security Council meeting on 29 November that it would not be allowed to 
determine Turkish policy on Cyprus. Privately, military officials insist that the threat 
will be backed by force if necessary, since it believes that a strong military presence in 
northern Cyprus, where it currently has 30,000 troops, is vital to Turkey's strategic needs 
(IISS 2002). It is obvious, therefore, that there is a serious conflict of interests on the 
Turkish side and more specifically, between the government and the military as it 
concerns the settlement of the Cyprus issue in the context of the Annan Plan. Given that 
Cyprus has been already granted accession to the EU, the position of Turkey is rather 
                                                          
2
 It is indicative that the Cypriot GDP amounted to $9.1 bn. for the period 1998–2001 while the 
corresponding figure for the North barely reached 10% of this figure (IISS 2002). The hesitant attitude of 
the Cypriot government vis-à-vis the Annan Plan, however, is due to more than what meets the eye, since 
it imposes indirect, however binding restrictions concerning the control of the Cypriot FIR and the 
weapons of the troops kept by Greece and Turkey on the island. Additional problems may arise 
concerning the approval of the Annan Plan by the concurrent referendums in the south and the north of 
Cyprus on March 30, 2003. The voters will be asked to approve or not a package of four crucial issues 
referring to the structure of the new Cypriot state, its constitution, the terms of the treaty between Cyprus, 
Greece, Turkey and the UK and the EU accession of Cyprus, all with a “yes” or “no”. 
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delicate, as it has to compromise between the Turkish Cypriots interests and its own 
future as an EU candidate on one hand and its strategic interests on another.  
Bearing the above developments in mind, therefore, one should start wondering to 
what extent the optimism expressed by the Greek side regarding the future of the 
Greek–Turkish relations is well founded. Indeed there has been a widespread impression 
that, following these latest developments, business between the two countries in the 
form of direct investment flows will be flourishing, with Greece being one of the 
leading supporters of the Turkish EU candidacy. Both countries have even applied to 
host the Euro 2008 football championship jointly! But above all the most striking 
conclusion drawn by those sharing this optimism is that the arms race between the two 
countries which for decades now devours considerable GDP shares in both countries 
(Andreou and Zombanakis 2000 and 2001) will be led to its end. And to make things 
even more preposterous, the Greek Ministry of Defence has proceeded to a one sided 
reduction of its defence procurement programme for a third time since 2001, while it 
has recently announced a further reduction of the compulsory military service term.  
Given the contrast between this lackadaisical attitude from the part of the Greek 
authorities on one hand and the fundamental differences concerning the Cyprus issue 
between government and military in Turkey, this paper aims at forecasting the 
developments concerning the settlement of the Cyprus issue after the Copenhagen EU 
summit. What we plan to do, more specifically, is to evaluate the extent to which one 
should share the Greek optimism concerning the improvement of the Greek-Turkish 
relations and the subsequent reduction of tension that will lead in its turn, to the end of 
the arms race currently burdening the economies of both sides. Section 2 provides the 
technical background of this work. What it does, more specifically, is to explain how the 
use of Genetic Algorithms can contribute to the efficiency of Certainty Neuron Fuzzy 
Cognitive Maps (CNFCMs) in cases of crisis management and decision-making. The 
model that we use to represent the setting of the problem is presented in section 3. The 
combination of the two techniques contributes to the construction of our hybrid model 
that reflects the political and strategic setting as described in the Introduction. The next 
section deals with the various scenarios and the results forecasted following a number of 
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simulation exercises while the final section of the paper presents the conclusions 
derived.  
 
 
5.2 TECHNICAL BACKGROUND 
Cognitive Maps (CMs) were introduced by Axelrod (1976) and were mainly used to 
support political decisions in international relations. A CM employs a technique based 
on qualitative reasoning and can be used by an individual decision-maker to study or 
interpret knowledge that involves many interacting concepts. These concepts are 
represented as nodes while directed arrows are used to show the causal relationships 
between them. Each arrow is characterized by a weight, a real value that indicates the 
degree of influence of the causal relationship between any two connected nodes. This 
representation, in which concepts are considered as variables of the system, gives a 
figure of nodes and arrows called “cognitive map”. Such a map may represent three 
different types of causal relationships underlining the links between them as well as the 
degree of influence between concepts and causal relationships: 
 Positive (+) causality expressed by words like “promotes”, “enhances”, “is 
benefit to” etc. An increase / decrease of the causal relationship will cause an 
increase / decrease in both the “cause” and the “effect” variables.   
 Negative (-) causality expressed by words like “retards”, “prevents”, “is harmful 
to” et c. In cases of a negative causal relationship an increase in the “cause” 
variable will result to a decrease of the “effect” variable. 
 No effect (0) described as “no effect on”, “does not influence” et c.  
To indicate, in addition, the intensity of the relationships between these variables 
one needs to employ a Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM), which has been developed by 
political scientists in order to analyze, predict and understand decisions imitating the 
cognitive process of human experts on various fields of expertise. Fuzzy Cognitive 
Maps (FCMs) are soft computing tools (Zadeh 1997a,b) that combine elements of fuzzy 
logic and neural networks. FCM theory was developed recently (Kosko 1986, 1992) as 
an extension of cognitive maps used for planning and making decisions in the fields of 
international relations, in modeling social systems and in studying political 
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developments in the context of such systems. Strictly speaking, a FCM is a figure 
composed of nodes and edges, the former introducing the qualitative concepts of the 
analysis while the latter indicate the various causal relationships. Each concept node 
possesses a numeric state, which denotes the qualitative measure of its presence in the 
conceptual domain. Thus, a high numerical value indicates that the concept is strongly 
present in the analysis while a negative or zero value indicates that the concept is not 
currently active or relevant to the conceptual domain.  
A FCM works in discrete steps (Kosko 1992). When a strong positive correlation 
exists between the current state of a concept and that of another concept in a preceding 
period, we say that the former positively influences the latter indicating this by a 
positively weighted arrow directed from the causing to the influenced concept. By 
contrast, when a strong negative correlation exists, it reveals the existence of a negative 
causal relationship indicated by an arrow charged with a negative weight. Two 
conceptual nodes without a direct link are, obviously, independent. 
The activation level of the system nodes and the weighted arrows are each set to a 
specific value based on the experts believes.  Afterwards the system is free to interact 
until the model: 
 Reaches equilibrium at a fixed point with the values of the activation level 
remaining stable in the interval [-1 1] independently of time.  
 Exhibits limit cycle behaviour, falling in loop of a specific period.  
 Exhibits a chaotic behaviour. 
In order to increase the reliability of the weight matrix Kosko (1986) suggested 
consulting more than one expert, while the experience of these experts has been rated 
with a value from 1 to 10. If Si is the score of expert i and Wi is the weight matrix of the 
FCM defined by that expert, the final weight matrix is given by the following formula 
(Taber and Siegel 1987).  




N
i
j
i
N
i
i
S
WS
W
1
1
               (1) 
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In 1997, the introduction of the Certainty Neuron Fuzzy Cognitive Maps 
(CNFCMs) (i.e. Tsadiras and Margaritis 1996, 1998), provided additional fuzzification 
to FCMs, by allowing for various activation levels of each concept between the two 
extreme cases, i.e. between activation or not. In other words, this combination of Fuzzy 
Logic (Zadeh 1992, Cox 1994) and Neural Networks (Kartalopoulos 1996) creates 
models that emulate reasoning and the decision-making process using fuzzy causal 
relationship. The flexibility of such models is improved by allowing for a variety of 
activation levels of each concept thus creating a Certainty Neuron Fuzzy Cognitive 
Maps (CNFCM).  
More specifically, a function ()f  coming from the area of expert systems was used 
to return the new certainty factor of a fact after receiving new evidence for, or against 
previous believes based on the present certainty factor.  
The updating function of a CNFCM is the following:  
 
  tiititifti AdASA 1          (2) 
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 Ai is the activation level of concept Ci at time )1( t  or )(t , equation (3) is the 
sum of the weighted influences that concept Ci receives at time step t from all other 
concepts, di is a decay factor (Tsadiras and Margaritis 1996), and  
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is the function used for the aggregation of certainty factors (Kosko 1992). The 
meaning of the above function is that the external influence can affect the activation of a 
concept just to a certain degree.  
We propose the following modification to the third case of equation (4) as follows: 
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iS
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iA
t
i )),,min(1( 
   (5) 
to cover the undesired situation in which one of
t
i
t
i
SA and equals to 1 and the other 
to –1 leading the denominator to zero.  
Given the structure of a CNFCM as described above it is easy to see that its ability 
to combine the input supplied by domain experts together with its flexibility makes it a 
useful tool for analyzing tough political problems and suggesting plausible solutions in 
an environment of political uncertainty (Tsadiras and Margaritis 1997).    
 
 
5.3 THE MODEL 
The structure of this model (Table1, Figure 1) relies heavily on previous research 
on the Cyprus issue using Fuzzy Cognitive Maps and Genetic Algorithms (Mateou et al. 
2003, Andreou et al. 2003) and has been built to reflect the political framework 
describing the Cyprus problem shortly before the Copenhagen Summit Conference, in 
December 2002
3
.  
 
Table 1. Description of the concepts 
C1 Cyprus EU Full Accession 
C2 Escalation of Tension 
C3 Settlement of the Cyprus Issue 
C4 Turkish - Cypriot Position 
C5 Position of the Turkish Government 
C6 The Cyprus Issue Solution Framework 
C7 Position of Cypriot Government 
C8 Position of the European Union 
C9 Position of the Greek Government 
C10 Reactions of U.S. – U.K. 
C11 Invasion in Iraq 
 
                                                          
3
 Given that our revision has taken place after the end of the Copenhagen Summit Conference (CSC) we 
had an excellent opportunity to evaluate our model in terms of its applicability by simply comparing the 
results obtained in the form of conclusions after the (CSC) to the findings derived by the initial dynamic 
simulation exercise. 
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The construction of the model has been based on the method of questionnaires and 
interviews (Roberts 1976). According to this we have identified the important concepts 
or variables influencing our strategic target, i.e. the EU accession of Cyprus (C1) as well 
as the various causal links between them. This was a procedure, which has been based 
on input provided by a team of domain experts. These experts filled in a questionnaire 
concerning the causal relationships and the weights characterising them, i.e. the degree 
to which concepts influence each other, using a scale between -1 and 1, to indicate the 
direction and intensity of these relationships (Taber and Siegel 1987).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Cyprus issue CNFCM model 
 
 
Bearing in mind that fuzzy variables can be positive, zero, or negative and 
quantifying their magnitude as small, medium, or large (Kosko 1992) we can obtain six 
fuzzy-set values excluding zero: 
 NL : Negative Large      
 NM: Negative Medium  
 NS: Negative Small       
w19: C6,C7 
w20: C6,C9 
w21: C6,C8 
w22: C11,C6 
w23: C7,C3 
w24: C8,C7 
w25: C10,C7 
w26: C10,C8 
w27: C11,C9 
w28: C10,C9 
w29: C9,C7 
w30: C10,C11 
w31: C11,C2 
w32: C1,C6 
w33: C1,C3 
w34: C1,C4 
w35: C1,C7 
C2 
C3 
C4 
C8 
C9 
C7 
C10 
C11 
C1 
w1: C3,C1 
w2: C8,C1 
w3: C9,C1  
w4: C10,C1 
w5: C5,C1  
w6: C2,C1  
w7: C3,C2  
w8: C5,C2  
w9: C9,C2 
w10: C10,C2 
w11: C10,C3 
w12: C4,C3 
w13: C10,C4 
w14: C6,C4 
w15: C5,C4 
w16: C6,C5 
w17: C10,C5 
w18: C11,C5 
 
 
C6 
C5 
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 ZE:  Zero  
 PS: Positive Large       
 PM: Positive Medium   
 PS: Positive Small       
Using the above classification the experts constructed the initial fuzzy matrix used 
by the model as knowledge base, appearing in Table 2. This knowledge base has been 
built to describe the magnitude of each concept determining the initial equilibrium 
conditions of the model and facilitating the forecasting procedure. 
The general model of Figure 1 was then built, in which the various concepts of the 
model interact with one other. The two leading or fundamental concepts of interest in 
this model are the EU accession of Cyprus's (C1), and the role of the UN through the 
submission of the Annan Plan (C6), with the answer to our crucial question concerning 
the relations between Greece and Turkey depending, to a large extent, on concept C2 
representing an environment of tension on the island. The various weights are listed on 
the right-hand side of Figure 1 in a form that indicates the link from the initial to the 
terminal concept, with concepts separated by commas.  
Promising as they may appear, the CNFCMs have two weak points: The first 
involves the invariability of the weights, which leaves only the activation levels to 
participate in the configuration of a political problem. The second lies with the inability 
of the method to model a certain political situation by performing all possible 
computational simulations following the change of a certain weight or group of weights. 
These problems are solved by combining CNFCMs with Genetic Algorithms (GAs) thus 
creating a hybrid model: The CNFCM part of the algorithm computes the final 
activation levels given the weights and relationships between concepts (see the 
Appendix for details on the computation process), while the GA part develops the 
weight matrix attempting to find the optimal set of weights that satisfy a predefined 
activation level for a specific concept. A hybrid model of this type, therefore, traces the 
degree of the causal relationships between the various concepts such that it can “force” 
them to be activated to a certain level. Hybrid models of this type are expected to 
contribute to the effectiveness of decision-making by defining, for each concept, the 
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activation level achieved using a certain set of weights evolved by the GA (Goldberg 
1989, Michalewicz 1994). 
 
 
Table 2. Fuzzy model analysis 
Concept Fuzzy Values Description 
C
1
: 
C
y
p
ru
s 
E
U
 F
u
ll
 
A
cc
es
si
o
n
 
0.66 to 1 
Cyprus EU Full Accession. Freedom of Authority Exercise 
Ranges Between Considerable and Complete. 
0.31 to 0.65 
Cyprus EU Full Accession. Freedom of Authority Exercise 
Ranges Between Considerable and Inadequate. 
0 to 0.3 Cyprus EU Full Accession. No Solution to the Cyprus Issue. 
-0.32 to 0 
Cyprus EU Full Accession Revised in Anticipation of a 
Pending Solution. 
-0.33 to –0.65 Cyprus EU Full Accession Suspended until a Final Solution. 
-1 to -0.66 
Cyprus EU Full Accession Rejected. No Solution to the 
Cyprus Issue. 
C
2
: 
 E
sc
a
la
ti
o
n
 o
f 
T
en
si
o
n
 
0.66 to 1 Tension Escalation. Warfare 
0.31 to 0.65 Large Scale Provocative Incidents 
0 to 0.3 Small Scale Provocative Incidents 
-0.32 to 0 
Statements and Intensions to Actions Aiming at Reducing 
Tension. 
-0.33 to –0.65 Actions Aiming at Reducing Tension. 
-1 to -0.66 Stability on the Island. 
C
3
: 
S
et
tl
em
en
t 
o
f 
th
e 
C
y
p
ru
s 
Is
su
e
 
0.66 to 1 Generally Acceptable Solution of the Cyprus Issue. 
0.31 to 0.65 Basis for Settlement of the Cyprus Issue. 
0 to 0.3 Talks Aiming at Reaching an Agreement on the Cyprus Issue. 
-0.32 to 0 Stagnation Concerning the Cyprus Issue. 
-0.33 to –0.65 
Adverse Developments Concerning the Cyprus Issue. Dead 
end. 
-1 to -0.66 
No Possibilities for Solution. Two Separate States on the 
Island. 
C
4
: 
T
u
rk
is
h
 –
 
C
y
p
ri
o
t 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 0.66 to 1 Acceptance of Annan Plan After a Referendum. 
0.31 to 0.65 Acceptance of Annan Plan After Negotiations. 
0 to 0.3 Acceptance of Annan Plan as it Stands. 
-0.32 to 0 Rejection of Annan Plan After Negotiations. 
-0.33 to –0.65 Rejection of Annan Plan After a Referendum. 
-1 to -0.66 Rejection of Annan Plan as it Stands. 
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Table 2. Fuzzy model analysis (continued) 
Concept Fuzzy Values Description 
C
5
: 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
T
u
rk
is
h
 G
o
v
e
rn
m
en
t 0.66 to 1 
Acceptance of Annan Plan in Line with a Turkish – Cypriot 
Decision. 
0.31 to 0.65 Acceptance of Annan Plan After Negotiations. 
0 to 0.3 Acceptance of Annan Plan as it Stands. 
-0.32 to 0 
Rejection of Annan Plan in Line with a Turkish – Cypriot 
Decision. 
-0.33 to –0.65 Rejection of Annan Plan After Negotiations. 
-1 to -0.66 Rejection of Annan Plan as it Stands. 
C
6
:T
h
e 
C
y
p
ru
s 
Is
su
e 
S
o
lu
ti
o
n
 
F
ra
m
ew
o
rk
 
0.66 to 1 Full Approval of Plan. 
0.31 to 0.65 Satisfactory Plan. 
0 to 0.3 Negotiable Plan. 
-0.32 to 0 Adverse Elements in the Plan. 
-0.33 to –0.65 Unsatisfactory Plan. 
-1 to -0.66 Unacceptable Plan. 
C
7
: 
P
o
si
ti
o
n
 o
f 
C
y
p
ri
o
t 
G
o
v
er
n
m
e
n
t 
0.66 to 1 Acceptance of Annan Plan After a Referendum. 
0.31 to 0.65 Acceptance of Annan Plan After Negotiations. 
0 to 0.3 Acceptance of Annan Plan as it Stands. 
-0.32 to 0 Rejection of Annan Plan After Negotiations. 
-0.33 to –0.65 Rejection of Annan Plan After a Referendum. 
-1 to -0.66 Rejection of Annan Plan as it Stands. 
C
8
:P
o
si
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
 U
n
io
n
 0.66 to 1 Cyprus Full Accession and Solution of the Cyprus Issue. 
0.31 to 0.65 Cyprus Full Accession. Further Talks for a Solution. 
0 to 0.3 Cyprus Full Accession. No Solution to the Cyprus Issue. 
-0.32 to 0 Cyprus Full Accession Pending Until Solution. 
-0.33 to –0.65 
Cyprus Full Accession Postponed Anticipating Negotiations 
Results. 
-1 to -0.66 Cyprus Full Accession Fails. 
C
9
:P
o
si
ti
o
n
 o
f 
th
e 
G
re
ek
 G
o
v
er
n
m
e
n
t 0.66 to 1 
Acceptance of Annan Plan in Line with a Cyprus 
Government Decision. 
0.31 to 0.65 Acceptance of Annan Plan After Negotiations. 
0 to 0.3 Acceptance of Annan Plan as it Stands. 
-0.32 to 0 
Rejection of Annan Plan in Line with a Cyprus Government 
Decision. 
-0.33 to –0.65 Rejection of Annan Plan After Negotiations. 
-1 to -0.66 Rejection of Annan Plan as it Stands. 
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Table 2. Fuzzy model analysis (continued) 
Concept Fuzzy Values Description 
C
1
0
: 
R
ea
ct
io
n
s 
o
f 
U
.S
. 
–
 U
.K
. 
0.66 to 1 
Strong Pressure for a Solution and Support of Cyprus Full 
Accession. 
0.31 to 0.65 
Discrete Pressure on Both Sides for Full Accession and 
Solution. 
0 to 0.3 
Neutral Position. Distances Kept against Both Sides on the 
Island Regarding Full Accession and Solution. 
-0.32 to 0 Reduced Interest in a Solution Following Full Accession. 
-0.33 to –0.65 Reduced Interest in a Solution Before Full Accession. 
-1 to -0.66 
Indifference Regarding Full Accession and Solution of the 
Cyprus Issue. 
C
1
1
: 
In
v
a
si
o
n
 i
n
 
Ir
a
q
 
0.66 to 1 Attack Against Iraq. 
0.31 to 0.65 Preparatory Stage for Assault. 
0 to 0.3 Considerable Chances for an Assault. 
-0.32 to 0 Small Chances for an Assault. 
-0.33 to –0.65 Remote Chances for an Assault. 
-1 to -0.66 No Possibilities for an Assault. 
 
 
The essence of the Genetically Evolved Certainty Neuron Fuzzy Cognitive Map 
(GECNFCM) model lies with tracing the optimal weight matrix corresponding to a 
desired activation level for a given concept as computed by a simple CNFCM model 
(Andreou et al. 2003). More specifically, the GA evolves a population of individuals 
each of which consists of a weight matrix describing the degree of causal relationships 
between the concepts of Figure 1. The initial generation contains weights matrices with 
random values. The evolution of the individuals is performed with the help of the 
CNFCM model, which computes the final activation levels of the concepts using 
equations 3 to 5. The activation level of a certain concept in focus denoted by Ad,i  is 
used to calculate the fitness of each individual-weight matrix WMi according to the 
following function: 
fitness(WMi)=1/(1-abs(Ad,i – mean50(Aa,i))                   (6) 
where Ad,i is the target (desired) value of the activation level for the concept in 
focus Ci and mean50(Aa,i) is the mean value of the last fifty actual activation levels of 
concept Ci as these are computed by the CNFCM (t variable in equation (4)). It is clear 
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from equation (6) that the closer to the target value this mean is, the more appropriate 
the weight matrix. In fact, the fitness function uses the average of the last fifty activation 
levels to take into consideration a possible final state of the model which presents limit-
cycles, that is, a state in which the Ad,i exhibit periodic fluctuations and do not stabilize 
at equilibrium values. Thus, if the activation level of the concept in focus reaches 
equilibrium then the corresponding weight matrix in this case can be considered more 
appropriate compared to another individual-matrix that has resulted to limit cycle 
behaviour. 
The simulations conducted to test the functionality and predictability of our model 
were based on the following constant values for the variables involved: The population 
size has been set equal to 100 and the number of generations equal to 400. The weight 
values were initialised in the range [-1.0, 1.0] while the probability of applying the 
genetic operator of crossover was set to 0.25 and that of mutation to 0.01.The 
simulations that follow retrieve the final activation levels of the rest of the concepts, as 
well as the strength of the causal relationship between them. The analyst is thus given 
the means to proceed to tactical movements in his decision-making by varying the 
degree of such relationships taking into account the final activation levels that the model 
has suggested.  
 
 
Table 3.  Weight matrix according to the domain experts 
W1 
C3-C1 
W2 
C8-C1 
W3 
C9-C1 
W4 
C10-C1 
W5 
C5-C1 
W6 
C2-C1 
W7 
C3-C2 
W8 
C5-C2 
W9 
C9-C2 
0.02 0.22 0.22 -0.11 -0.11 -0.19 -0.16 0.18 -0.16 
W10 
C10-C2 
W11 
C10-C3 
W12 
C4-C3 
W13 
C10-C4 
W14 
C6-C4 
W15 
C5-C4 
W16 
C6-C5 
W17 
C10-C5 
W18 
C11-C5 
0.22 -0.16 -0.18 0.12 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.14 0.17 
W19 
C6-C7 
W20 
C6-C9 
W21 
C6-C8 
W22 
C11-C6 
W23 
C7-C3 
W24 
C8-C7 
W25 
C10-C7 
W26 
C10-C8 
W27 
C11-C9 
0.2 0.2 0.16 0.02 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.01 
W28 
C10-C9 
W29 
C9-C7 
W30 
C10-C11 
W31 
C11-C2 
W32 
C1-C6 
W33 
C1-C3 
W34 
C1-C4 
W35 
C1-C7 
 
0.11 0.14 0.22 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.13  
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Our model, using the weights depicted in Table 3 as these were defined by the 
experts, has reached equilibrium, as indicated in Figure 2, after 250 interactions (t 
variable in eq. (3) to (5)), thus calculating the new activation levels of the eleven 
concepts presented in Table 4.  
 
 
Table 4. Activation levels (Ai) for the Baseline scenario 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 
0.2 -0.25 0.32 -0.35 -0.58 0.49 0.38 0.52 0.58 0.32 -0.57 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Stabilization of the model in equilibrium 
 
 
It is very encouraging to point out that although the baseline simulation providing 
the initial equilibrium conditions of our model was performed before the CSC on 
December 12–14, 2002, it has nevertheless captured the dynamics of the Cyprus issue as 
follows:  
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i. The activation level (AL) of concept C1 representing the EU accession of 
Cyprus has stabilised to 0.2. Given that the range of possible values has been set 
between –1 and +1, and by looking at Table 2 denoting the ranges of the various 
ALs used in our fuzzy model analysis, this value lies within the range of PS 
(Positive Small), indicating the existence of a distinct possibility of EU 
accession without a settlement of the Cyprus issue. The results of the CSC of 
December 02 simply confirmed our forecast.     
ii. Concept C2 is of considerable importance for the analysis, since it stands for the 
degree of tension on the island, assuming a simulated activation level of A2=-
0.25. This value together with the negative sign forecast the reduction of tension 
and the conciliatory attitude of the new Turkish government following the 
submission of the Annan Plan. Indeed, it seems that the Islamists do not insist on 
their predecessors’ threats involving “unlimited reactions” in case of an 
accession before a settlement of the Cyprus issue. 
iii. The commitment of the two sides to continue working for a settlement of the 
Cyprus issue until the end of February 2003 is reflected to a forecasted activation 
level of A3=0.32 for the third concept C3 representing a solution to the Cyprus 
problem.  
iv. The rejection of the Annan Plan, as proposed by both the Turkish-Cypriot 
authorities and the Turkish Government under the pressure of the Turkish 
National Security Council, is forecasted by the values assumed for the fourth and 
the fifth concepts respectively, i.e. A4=-0.35 and A5=-0.58. The validity of our 
forecasts concerning the inflexibility of the Turkish side has been verified during 
the CSC, when then UN Secretary envoy, Mr Alvaro De Soto, failed to arrange a 
new round of direct bilateral talks based on the Annan Plan, following a 
rejection by the Turkish Cypriot regime. By contrast, the attitude of the Cyprus 
government, which regards the Annan Plan as a sound basis for further talks, is 
very successfully forecasted by the model that yields a value of the AL for the 
relevant concept C7 equal to A7=0.38. In fact, the Cyprus Government was ready 
to start negotiations during the CSC, a position supported by the Greek 
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Government (C9), which is forecasted to favour a solution of the problem 
following negotiations, given that its AL is simulated to A9=0.58.  
v. Turning, finally, to the forecasted attitude of the international environment, the 
eighth concept that represents the position of the European Union assumes a 
baseline activation level of A8=0.52. This is considered reasonable given that the 
EU favours both the accession of Cyprus and the continuation of the talks 
aiming at a settlement of the Cyprus issue. The moderate pressure exercised by 
the US and the UK on both sides on the island is reflected in an AL value of 
A10=0.32 for this tenth concept, while available information thus far indicates a 
possibility to avoid an invasion in Iraq, at least until the submission of the UN 
experts report on the nuclear and biological arsenal of Iraq.  
 
 
5.4 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
Having thus established, following our CNFCM baseline simulation, the 
functionality of our model which reflects the complexity of the Cyprus issue in its pre-
Copenhagen Summit Conference form, we can now proceed to examining a variety of 
possible policy scenarios. As it has already been pointed out, this task that will be 
performed using Genetic Algorithms and Scenario Analysis (Godet 1987, Bunn and 
Salo 1993), requires assigning our two leading targets, namely the EU accession of 
Cyprus and the solution of the Cyprus issue, a certain activation level that reflects the 
degree to which they are designed to attain, according to each scenario. Once this has 
been established, the algorithm will then provide the values required for the 
instrumental variables of the system, namely its activation levels and concept weights to 
attain the specific target set. The evaluation and interpretation of the results will be 
based on the predetermined range of possible values presented in Table 2. 
Taking into account the picture, as it stands on a cut–off date, sometime in early 
January 2003, we have decided to consider the forecast for the following three possible 
scenarios:  
 
Scenario A: The Optimistic Case 
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The optimistic outlook of the Cyprus issue provides for the following scenario: 
Cyprus becomes a full EU member while the Cyprus issue is resolved by allowing the 
Cypriot government a large number of degrees of freedom in order to implement its 
economic and social policy for the entire island. Our genetic algorithm requires that this 
framework is described by increasing the activation level of C1 to A1=0.9, yielding in 
equilibrium mode (Figure 3) the optimal weight matrix depicted in Table 5, while Table 
6 provides the corresponding ALs which verify the reliability of our model. Indeed, the 
AL of concept C1 that represents full EU accession converges from an initial 0.2 to 
0.82, a figure that reveals that the Cypriot government has been allowed unconstrained 
freedom of movement in order to implement its economic and social policy for both 
communities on the island. Such an event, however, as the model indicated, will trigger 
tension on the island, given that the AL of the corresponding concept C2 rises to 
A2=0.73. It is interesting to point out, however, that the Turkish Cypriot community will 
be eager to accept the “carte blanche” given to the Cypriot State (A4= 0.8) since this 
arrangement will entail considerable welfare improvement following their full EU 
membership
4
.  
By contrast, the expected reaction of the Turkish side to such an arrangement is 
forecasted to be a straightforward rejection since the corresponding C5 assumes a 
strongly negative value (A5=-0.62), thus generating a further source of tension between 
the two sides. Concerning the Annan Plan, the forecast concerning both the Cypriot and 
the Greek governments indicates that they will accept its final form following a 
referendum (A7=0.77 and A9=0.88), with the consensus of Athens (A6=0.1).  
The reaction of the international community is forecasted as a certain amount of 
pressure by the US and the UK (A10=0.67) for a settlement of the problem, while the 
position of the EU in this case, represented by an A8=-0.65 might be a surprise to a 
certain extent. In fact, according to Table 2 such a figure corresponds to the possibility 
of suspension of the EU accession of Cyprus in anticipation of a final solution.  
 
 
                                                          
4
 The reaction of the Turkish Cypriots is expected to contribute to promoting tension on the island and to 
complicate matters. In fact, Mehmet Ali Talat, head of the Turkish Cypriot opposition Republican Turkish 
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Table 5.  GECNFCM optimal weight matrix for the Optimistic Case scenario 
w1 
C3-C1 
w2 
C8-C1 
w3 
C9-C1 
w4 
C10-C1 
w5 
C5-C1 
w6 
C2-C1 
w7 
C3-C2 
w8 
C5-C2 
w9 
C9-C2 
0.89 0.04 0.91 0.38 -0.02 0.68 1 -0.18 0.41 
w10 
C10-C2 
w11 
C10-C3 
w12 
C4-C3 
w13 
C10-C4 
w14 
C6-C4 
w15 
C5-C4 
w16 
C6-C5 
w17 
C10-C5 
w18 
C11-C5 
0.72 0.28 0.97 0.10 0.01 -0.2 -0.18 -0.59 -0.27 
w19 
C6-C7 
w20 
C6-C9 
w21 
C6-C8 
w22 
C11-C6 
w23 
C7-C3 
w24 
C8-C7 
w25 
C10-C7 
w26 
C10-C8 
w27 
C11-C9 
-0.20    0.18 -0.52 0 0.80 -0.53 -0.23 0.88 0 
w28 
C10-C9 
w29 
C9-C7 
w30 
C10-C11 
w31 
C11-C2 
w32 
C1-C6 
w33 
C1-C3 
w34 
C1-C4 
w35 
C1-C7 
 
-0.76 0.69 -0.68 -0.36 -0.54 -0.14 0.73 0.66  
 
 
 
Table 6. Activation levels calculated with GECNFCM’s optimal weights for the Optimistic 
Case scenario 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 
0.82 0.73 0.87 0.80 -0.62 0.10 0.77 -0.65 0.88 0.67 -0.33 
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
February (IISS 2002). 
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Figure 3. Optimistic Case (scenario 1): Equilibrium for A1=0.9 
 
 
Scenario B: The Complex Case 
This scenario provides for a full EU membership, together with a settlement of the 
Cyprus issue such that the government is not allowed to implement its policy on the 
entire island. This scenario, therefore, requires that the initial AL of concept C1 be 
increased from 0.2 to 0.4. The model is shown to have reached equilibrium in Figure 4 
with the calculated optimal weight matrix presented in Table 7 and the eleven concepts 
activated as indicated in Table 8. 
Following the recalculation of weights by our genetic algorithm the model leads to 
an AL equal to A1= 0.39. The reduced degrees of freedom allowed to the authority of the 
Cypriot government by the finalized version of the Annan Plan lead to the consensus of 
the Turkish Cypriot authorities and the subsequent tension reduction, since the AL of C2 
reaches A2=-0.42. It follows, therefore, that the referendum on the Turkish Cypriot side 
will lead to accepting the Plan (A4=0.77), with the approval of the Turkish government  
(A5=0.77), unlike the one conducted by the Cypriot government which is forecasted to 
reject it (A7=-0.51). It is interesting to see that the Greek government might be inclined 
to accept an improved version of the Plan following a period of negotiations (A9=0.45). 
The apparent contrast of positions between the Greek and the Cypriot government is not 
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altogether that unexpected given the emphasis that the former places on the 
improvement of the relations between the EU and Turkey. Finally, the pressure from the 
US–UK is always strong (A10=0.84), while the position of the EU is clearly in favor of a 
deferment of Cyprus's accession (A8=-0.52), since the last thing it would ask for is 
another extra domestic problem to solve in the event of an unsatisfactory solution for 
one of its members involved in the Cyprus issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. GECNFCM optimal weight matrix for the Complex Case scenario 
W1 
C3-C1 
W2 
C8-C1 
W3 
C9-C1 
W4 
C10-C1 
W5 
C5-C1 
W6 
C2-C1 
W7 
C3-C2 
W8 
C5-C2 
W9 
C9-C2 
0.43 0.23 0.91 0.61 -0.77 -0.26 -0.29 -0.94 0.22 
W10 
C10-C2 
W11 
C10-C3 
W12 
C4-C3 
W13 
C10-C4 
W14 
C6-C4 
W15 
C5-C4 
W16 
C6-C5 
W17 
C10-C5 
W18 
C11-C5 
0.46 -0.67 0.71 0.61 0.95 0.51 -0.89 -0.99 -0.38 
W19 
C6-C7 
W20 
C6-C9 
W21 
C6-C8 
W22 
C11-C6 
W23 
C7-C3 
W24 
C8-C7 
W25 
C10-C7 
W26 
C10-C8 
W27 
C11-C9 
-0.36 -0.60 0.65 0 -0.22 0.48 -0.25 0.31 0 
W28 
C10-C9 
W29 
C9-C7 
W30 
C10-C11 
W31 
C11-C2 
W32 
C1-C6 
W33 
C1-C3 
W34 
C1-C4 
W35 
C1-C7 
 
0.55 0.28 -0.03 0.11 0.75 0.41 -0.66 0.50  
 
 
Table 8. Activation levels calculated with GECNFCM’s optimal weights for the Complex Case 
scenario 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 
0.39 -0.42 0.67 0.77 0.77 -0.73 -0.51 -0.52 0.45 0.84 -0.7 
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Figure 4. Complex Case (scenario 2): Equilibrium for A1=0.4 
 
Scenario C: The Pessimistic Case.  
This scenario faces the possibility of a suspended EU full accession, despite the 
Copenhagen summit decision
5
, in anticipation of a solution to the Cyprus issue by 
setting the activation level of C1 to A1=-0.2, thus obtaining the optimal weight matrix 
depicted in Table 9 in equilibrium mode (Figure 5).  
 
 
 
Table 9. GECNFCM optimal weight matrix for the Pessimistic Case scenario 
W1 
C3-C1 
W2 
C8-C1 
W3 
C9-C1 
W4 
C10-C1 
W5 
C5-C1 
W6 
C2-C1 
W7 
C3-C2 
W8 
C5-C2 
W9 
C9-C2 
0.56 0.61 -0.69 -0.11 -0.95 -0.93 0.16 -0.47 -0.70 
W10 
C10-C2 
W11 
C10-C3 
W12 
C4-C3 
W13 
C10-C4 
W14 
C6-C4 
W15 
C5-C4 
W16 
C6-C5 
W17 
C10-C5 
W18 
C11-C5 
0.33 -0.09 -0.55 0.83 0.9 -0.55 0.01 -0.04 0.3 
W19 
C6-C7 
W20 
C6-C9 
W21 
C6-C8 
W22 
C11-C6 
W23 
C7-C3 
W24 
C8-C7 
W25 
C10-C7 
W26 
C10-C8 
W27 
C11-C9 
                                                          
5
 Indeed, despite the fact that Cyprus's EU accession has never been linked to the solution of the Cyprus 
issue by any means, the Helsinki Agreement signed in December 1999 (Paragraph 9b) states that before 
the ratification of the Cyprus EU accession, the Council will take into consideration all relevant factors 
concerning the Cyprus issue. Any possibility for a postponement, therefore, is expected to arise on these 
rounds, rather than as a result of a rejection in one of the member-states parliaments where such a 
rejection can only apply for all ten newly appointed members. 
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0.94 0.67 -0.92 0 0.44 -0.98 -0.57 0.8 0 
W28 
C10-C9 
W29 
C9-C7 
W30 
C10-C11 
W31 
C11-C2 
W32 
C1-C6 
W33 
C1-C3 
W34 
C1-C4 
W35 
C1-C7 
 
-0.25 -0.98 0.65 0.81 0.23 -0.58 0.65 -0.29  
 
 
 
As shown in Table 10 the concept representing EU accession of Cyprus is activated 
almost to its target value (A1=–0.13), while tension is expected to rise in this case as 
well (A2=0.43) following the stagnation prevailing as it concerns the Cyprus issue. The 
general attitude facing the Annan Plan involves rejections by both the Greek (A9=-0.55) 
and the Turkish (A5=-0.25) government, the position of the former being considerably 
stronger, while the two sides on the island are hesitant to accept (A4=0.03 for the 
Turkish Cypriots) or reject it (A7=-0.02). These results explain the position of the EU, 
which favors postponement of the Cyprus's accession until conclusion of the talks (A8=-
0.26). The US–UK side, finally, keeps pressing for a solution (A10=0.69), in anticipation 
of its invasion to Iraq which will require the use of a number of Turkish military air 
bases, a variable which is expected to carry increased weight in the bargain for a 
solution to the Cyprus issue
6
. 
 
 
 
Table 10. Activation levels calculated with GECNFCM’s optimal weights for the Pessimistic 
Case scenario 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 
-0,13 0,43 -0,01 0,03 -0,25 -0,45 -0,02 -0,26 -0,55 0,69 0,63 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 “On the Turkish side, the deadline of 28 February 2003 means that Ankara is unlikely to come under 
effective pressure from the US to reach a settlement, as Washington is currently more concerned with 
placating, rather than antagonizing, Turkey in order to secure its support for a possible military campaign 
against Iraq early next year” (IISS 2002). This means that the pressure for concessions on the Cyprus 
issue is expected to fall on the Greek side. 
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Figure 5. Pessimistic Case (scenario 3): Equilibrium for A1=-0.2 
 
 
 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
It is straightforward, therefore, that under the circumstances there is very little room 
for optimism with regard to possibilities of a drastic tension reduction concerning the 
relations between Greece and Turkey. In fact, in all the cases analyzed, one or both sides 
will be strongly opposed to the proposed solution of the Cyprus issue on the basis of the 
Annan Plan. The prospects are even gloomier as a result of the extent to which the two 
sides affect the decisions taken by Cyprus itself. In the case of the Turkish military, in 
particular, the pressure which it exercises may comply with the Turkish Cypriot 
authorities’ inflexibility; it is, however, in direct conflict to the aspirations of the 
overwhelming majority of the Turkish Cypriots, a position revealed by their massive 
demonstrations during late 2002 and early 2003. If one includes the conflict that has 
arisen between the Islamic government and the Turkish military after the November 
2002 elections in Turkey, then our hybrid model simply confirms the prolongation of 
tension between the two sides as a result of the difficulties in reaching an agreement on 
the Cyprus issue.  
Concerning the international environment, the Cyprus government must not rely on 
the decisions taken during the Copenhagen summit, until May 2004, the deadline for the 
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approval of these decisions by the 15 EU parliaments. The forecasted lack of enthusiasm 
from the part of the EU concerning Cyprus full membership is related to the skepticism 
of certain member states that would prefer avoiding an extra burden to the various EU 
problems, preferring to postpone Cyprus's EU accession until the issue has been 
resolved. Regarding the pressure exercised by the US–UK for a quick solution in view 
of an invasion of Iraq, this will hardly contribute to smoothening the tension between 
the Greek and the Turkish side.  
The hesitant attitude of the Cypriot state towards the Annan Plan may be due, 
among other things, to the enormous financial cost which it will bear in its effort to 
integrate the underdeveloped north. The prior experience of Germany on this issue 
raises serious concerns that this cost will be prohibitive for the economy of Cyprus, 
given its effort to comply with the Maastricht criteria and join the EMU and the 
Eurozone. 
A direct conclusion of the above is that the relaxed attitude of the Greek 
government regarding the prospects of its relations with Turkey is far from being 
justified. Given the pronounced clash of interests on the Cyprus problem between the 
two sides on one hand and the intense domestic conflict concerning political decision-
making in Turkey and on the Turkish–Cypriot side on another, the prospect of friction 
between Greece and Turkey will remain high. Consequently, the Cyprus issue, which we 
must be careful to regard as simply one of the problems concerning the Greek–Turkish 
relations, is expected to promote the arms race that burdens the economies of both sides 
in the foreseeable future.   
 
 
5.6 UPDATE  
We have completed this paper on March 20, 2003, Day One of the US–UK invasion 
to Iraq. This is a major international crisis, which we have considered in our model as 
affecting the Cyprus issue in more ways than one. In fact we are now in a position to 
evaluate the validity of our results and the predictability of our model, given that the 
developments concerning the Cyprus issue and the global political setting are currently 
at a very delicate phase.  
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What seems to be the case, therefore, is that the current developments with respect 
to the Cyprus issue and the associated international environment are very close to what 
we have called “the Complex Scenario”. Given that no solution has been attained by the 
end of February 2003, it appears that the Adhesion Act for the ten new members will be 
signed in Athens on April 16, 2003 and it will refer to the Republic of Cyprus as one 
entity. To what extent the EU will be willing to bargain the membership application of 
Turkey against the settlement of the Cyprus issue is a matter that remains to be seen.        
According to our “Complex Case”, therefore, it seems that the solution of the 
Cyprus issue may be left up to the EU dynamics in the context of an “acquis 
communautaire”, possibly leading to accessing the north of the island along the lines of 
the German renunciation. This means that whatever this solution may be is certainly 
going to be a question of long-term character. We must point out once again, however, 
in the light of the latest developments that we still cannot share the optimism of the 
Greek side concerning its bilateral relations with Turkey. The distance between the 
“Complex Case” and what we have termed the “Pessimistic Case” is far too small to be 
neglected. A possible incorporation of the third version of the Annan Plan to the 
Adhesion Act, or even a rejection of all ten applications by a member-state parliament, 
as a reaction to the backing offered by some of the EU newly selected members to the 
US foreign policy are possibilities which the Greek side must seriously consider.     
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Μάλλον γάρ πεφόβημαι τάς οικίας ημών  
αμαρτίας ή τάς τών εναντίων διανοίας  
(I would rather be concerned about our 
own errors rather than our adversaries’ plans) 
Thoukidides  
 
 
What we have done in this book is to examine certain key issues related to the 
Cyprus problem and the Greek–Turkish arms race and to provide answers to questions 
related to these issues. Our points and suggestions presented in this book are certainly 
not original. In fact, a large number of experts may have supported similar views now 
and then. We believe, however, that we have contributed a small step further in studying 
the relations between Greece and Turkey in the light of the Cyprus issue by using 
positive rather than normative analysis. Offering mathematical proofs to such issues 
beyond any reasonable doubt can entail a considerable number of benefits the least 
important being the time saved during the endless TV debates on the issue.  
Using this straightforward reasoning, therefore, we have shown how important the 
role of human resources is in arms races in general and in the case of the Greek–Turkish 
conflict, in particular, in which Turkey obviously has the upper hand, given the 
demographic developments in the two countries. The relative security measure we 
propose is merely one extra way to show the importance of human resources in the arms 
race between the two sides. We have shown that no matter how paradoxical it may 
sound, the state of an arms race between Greece and Turkey is the only way in which 
peace can be safeguarded in the broader area of Cyprus and the Aegean, given the 
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profound differences between the two sides, the role of each of which in this race, be it 
leader or follower, is clearly identified. The difference between the actual and the 
financially optimal defence expenditure for Greece and Cyprus which can be taken to 
approximate the peace dividend for the two partners, points out the excessive burden 
that the two countries must bear, given their commitments along the lines of the 
Integrated Defence Doctrine. This alliance, moreover, may prove much more fruitful if 
the two participants make use of their comparative advantage which dictates that Greece 
emphasizes on the procurement of equipment while Cyprus provides the manpower for 
both countries. The shift of the Greek defence doctrine towards flexibility, speed of 
action and modernization of equipment is certainly a good start. One should not forget, 
however, that this is an expensive solution and consequently it is not compatible with 
any defence budget cuts, given the fragility of the international equilibrium in the 
Middle East and the reaction of Turkey which remains a question mark following the 
U.S. - U.K. invasion and the post Saddam regime in Iraq. In fact, the Pentagon and the 
State Department, to a lesser extent, do not seem to be exactly pleased with the 
contribution of their traditional ally in the area, especially after the refusal of the 
parliament to allow the use of Turkish territory by US troops aiming at invading Iraq 
from the north. It seems that the extra cost in terms of both time and money which the 
allied forces suffered following the Turkish rejection of their demands has been 
subtracted from the admittedly generous US financial support to Turkey, although the 
latter did eventually collect a substantial fraction of this support. In fact there is a 
widespread opinion that Erdogan’s political maneuvers in this case have been admirable 
as he manages so far to keep a delicate balance between his strong Islamic backing, the 
Turkish military and the alliance commitments of his country. The fact remains, 
however, that irrespective of the extent to which Erdogan’s political balance will be 
fruitful, there is a distinct possibility that Turkey will invest on a more pronounced 
presence in the Aegean if not in Cyprus, even if this requires a more aggressive attitude 
from its part. History teaches that Turkey tends to export its domestic problems in the 
form of a variety of demands against neighboring countries. It follows, therefore, that in 
cases in which developments in the area turn against its strategic interests like, for 
example, the case of a US support to a Kurdish independent state, Turkey may shift its 
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focus towards alternative targets in Cyprus and the Aegean theatre. In the opposite case, 
again, in which its position as a US ally is upgraded, it will feel strong enough to press 
for increased American backing to its demands against Cyprus and Greece. 
Consequently, whatever the gains or losses for Turkey may be during the post Saddam 
era, the possibilities of friction in Cyprus and the Aegean continue to remain high during 
a period of detrimentally relaxed euphoria of the Greek side.  
A word of caution is required in this case: Both the Cyprus problem and the 
demands of Turkey in the Aegean Sea are issues which affect the relations between 
Greece and Turkey to a considerable extent, without, however, by any means being 
interdependent. In fact the Greek side has always rejected the logic of a package deal 
between the two countries. Concerning Cyprus, in particular, it seems that its EU full 
membership outlines a completely new strategic, political and socio-economic 
background very similar to the pre-Annan Plan era. What the Annan Plan proposed, in 
broad terms, has been a co-operation between Greece and Turkey on the island at the 
expense, at least to a very large extent, of its national sovereignty. What is more, the 
statements made by the UN Secretary praising the Greek and Cypriot side for their co-
operation and support could reveal much more than what meets the eye. We believe that 
what it does, in fact, is to point to the Greek side as the weakest of the two, in the sense 
of being more liable to negotiations, given the Turkish firm position which leaves no 
room for bargaining. In that sense, the Cyprus EU full membership by leaving no such 
room, allows the “acquis communautaire” to provide the unique framework for a final 
solution of the problem through the integration of the Turkish-Cypriot community on 
the island. The generous flow of financial support directed to the North and the 
measures taken by the Cypriot government in April 2003 promoting unobstructed labor 
mobility and trade flows throughout the island are certainly expected to contribute to 
this end. 
This does not mean, however, that we should all rely on the acquis communautaire 
and the international treaties for the settlement of our problems. Our recent experience 
based on developments in the Middle East points out to a very important message. In a 
strongly volatile political and strategic environment, which no longer enjoys the luxury 
of a delicate balance as a result of the Cold War, questions of legitimacy arise after any 
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arbitrary political or military move, questions that the UN has proved that it cannot 
answer effectively. This automatically implies that establishing the legitimacy of any 
such move or action will be left to those who undertake it. And it seems that in such 
cases the stronger the armed forces of those who seek legitimacy of their actions, the 
more convincing their arguments are.        
 
